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Abstract 
This article seeks to analyse the scope of the EU's involvement in Kosovo. The 
main argument presented is that the Union's role in Kosovo is a rather 
problematic one, characterised by a general lack of vision and a tendency to put 
European rather than local interests first. This could ultimately lead to a decrease 
in the perceived legitimacy of the EU as a benevolent actor in the former Serbian 
province, and could potentially undermine local political processes. This paper 
makes use of the conceptual framework of international post-conflict state-building 
exercise and discourse. It holds that the EU's policy is in line with similar state-
building efforts in various other regions of the world, and suffers from many of the 
same structural problems. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The text put forward in this paper was first used as an integral part of a group 
project conducted at Aalborg University, in collaboration with Sebastian Boll, 
Ingvar Örn Ingvarsson, Anders Purup and Chris Sturrock. Since then, and in line 
with widely held expectations, Kosovo has unilaterally declared independence 
from Serbia. Some 38 countries thus far have recognised the breakaway region, of 
which 18 are EU states (kosovothanksyou.com, 2008). On June 15th 2008, the new 
Kosovo constitution, which has been drafted along the conditions presented in the 
Ahtisaari plan, will enter into force. Meanwhile, the European mission (EULEX) 
that is to supplant the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has started moving in, 
even though its deployment deadline has been postponed and the withdrawal of 
the UN is currently being rethought, resulting in what was euphemistically termed 
a confusing situation on the ground (BBC, 2008). As the author inadvertently 
gathered from a conversation between EU diplomats at Pristina airport some 
months ago, even the EU is currently uncertain about how things should now 
further develop in Kosovo, let alone how this can be reconciled with what the UN 
and local political actors are doing. It does not seem unlikely that, only a few 
months after its declaration of independence, Kosovo will yet experience the 
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pleasure of sharing its newborn sovereignty with the EU and the UN 
simultaneously. Although the political situation on the ground has changed since 
last December, when this paper’s first incarnation was presented, it maintains that 
the arguments put forward at that time are still valid now. The settlement of 
Kosovo's final status did not drastically change the strategy of the EU or any other 
of the other international actors involved, and one could even argue, referring to 
the point made earlier, that it contributed to a general sense of uncertainty about 
how to progress from here on.  
 
This paper aims to analyse the actual and potential role of the EU's involvement in 
Kosovo, thereby making use of the state-building framework. In order to do this, 
the text has been divided into two major parts. In the first, the dynamics behind 
contemporary state-building will be outlined, as well as the reasons commonly 
given to legitimise the far-reaching international interference typifying state-
building. A brief history of its evolution in recent years will be presented, in order 
to demonstrate the increasing importance of the concept as well as the growing 
tendency of the international community to resort to state-building. In the second 
part of this paper, some of the key problems inherent in recent state-building 
practices will be put forward and it will be argued that the EU's role in Kosovo 
falls within this framework, and is therefore suffering from the same problems. In 
conclusion, this essay will advocate that, for the EU's various objectives in 
Kosovo to be successful, it will have to alter its tactics considerably.  
 
STATE-BUILDING: DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 
 
The concept of state-building has no clear definition and can therefore contain a 
number of different ideas and actions, depending on the academic sources 
employed. It is often seen as a synonym for nation-building or peace-building, 
although, as Chesterman (2004) points out, the focus of proclaimed attempts at 
nation-building have in the past most often been institutions of governance rather 
than the actual people, making the term ‘state-building’ the more feasible one. 
According to Chandler (2006), the objectives of state-building may most generally 
be defined as “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of 
providing citizens with physical and economic security” (p. 1). Of key importance, 
though, is that this always entails external involvement of one kind or another, 
that, in general, it is applicable to post-conflict societies, and, finally, that there 
seem to be clear ideas of what the outcome of contemporary attempts at state-
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building should look like. In the discourse of state-builders, the consolidation of 
peace is closely linked to the promotion of democracy, of human rights and the 
rule of law (UN General Assembly, 2005). 
 
The idea that states can (and should) be built or reconstructed by the international 
community may be viewed both as the product of the post-Cold War era and as a 
reaction against the perceived threats that globalisation and modernity are posing 
to the autonomy of the state. This is not to deny the clear instances in the more 
distant past, in which certain regions and countries were governed by the 
international community or representatives thereof. Post-Second World War 
Germany and Japan are clear examples here, as is the administration of Danzig 
(1920-1937), of Tangier (1923-1957), and that of Trieste (1950-1954) by the 
League of Nations and, in the latter case, the UN (Korhonen, 2001, p. 503). It is 
just to suggest that the content of the state-building discourse in the last two 
decades is of a different nature altogether, and that its very existence is closely 
linked to the unique challenges of a globalised world (Robinson, 2007, p. 3). One 
look at the ambitions of contemporary state-building practitioners is sufficient to 
realize that what the UN is calling extended peace-keeping is, in effect, an attempt 
to drastically reshape post-conflict societies. Korhonen (2001) sums up some of 
the tasks which the UN has taken upon itself: “organisation of democratic 
elections, guarantee of security, organisation of transitional governments, 
constitutional reform, development of civil society, humanitarian relief, 
rehabilitation, rebuilding infrastructure, reactivating agriculture, (…) in other 
words 'international social engineering’” (p. 496).   
 
The most prominent actor in the state-building field has undoubtedly been the UN. 
Ever since the 1990s, however, a clear shift in the nature of UN-controlled 
peacekeeping operations has been evident, towards more complex missions that 
aim at assisting and providing in the accomplishment of the above-mentioned 
objectives. Chesterman (2004) defines the 1989 UN mission in Namibia and the 
1993 UNTAC mission in Cambodia as the UN’s first attempts at state-building. 
Their focus was mainly on the supervision and organisation of elections, and on 
general assistance to the civilian authority, with the final aim of changing the 
political structure of the states in question (p. 2). During most of the 90s, however, 
UN humanitarianism was seeking to circumvent the state rather than strengthen it. 
Academics have often pointed to the Liberal Peace Thesis in an attempt to explain 
this: this theory maintains that stability and peace can only be assured through 
market liberalisation, democratisation, integration into the global economy, the 
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reduction of state power and a heavy reliance on privatisation. It was not until the 
end of the decade, and until 2001 in terms of US foreign policy, that the main 
actors changed their approach to a seemingly more engaged form of external 
intervention (Chesterman, 2004). Bearing in mind the Washington Consensus-
inspired (neo-) liberal politics of the 90s, this renewed emphasis for strong states 
may indeed come as a surprise. Yet, as Cunliffe (2007) points out, the difference is 
only meaningful on a superficial level. The current rationale is in effect a 
continuation of that of the nineties, which implies that contemporary policies 
equally fail to address the issues commonly put forward by critics of the Liberal 
Peace Thesis. This assumption shows that international intervention still suffers 
from the same political reluctance that was so indicative of the humanitarianism of 
the late 1990s (Williams, 2005, p. 173).  
 
UNMIK (since 1999) and the UN Transitional Administration for East-Timor 
(UNTAET, 1999–2002) make up two of the UN's more recent, and arguably most 
ambitious state-building endeavours (Korhonen, 2001, p. 497), both of which have 
been authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
giving the missions a much broader mandate than many of the UN's humanitarian 
missions of the 1990s (UNSC, 1999a; 1999b; UN 1945). In the case of Kosovo, 
the UN aims to provide “transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions” 
(UNSC, 1999b, para. 10). It has the power to dissolve the Kosovar assembly, to 
remove or appoint officials, to withhold budget approval, to call for new elections, 
etc. It is thus effectively exercising the powers of a sovereign government (Hehir, 
2007a, p. 127). In present times, this amount of direct authority over post-conflict 
societies by international actors has largely become accepted as a legitimate way 
of addressing issues of so-called global interest, whereas, for example, regarding 
the UN administration of the city of Trieste, it was exactly this form of direct 
control over domestic affairs that was highly contested by a considerable number 
of states (Chesterman, 2004, p. 55).  
 
To explain the current focus on state-building within contemporary international 
relations, Robinson (2007) points to the characteristics of the post-Cold War 
world; he identifies the emergence of the problem of the weak state as one of the 
key elements behind the state-building discourse. He also argues that, ever since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even more so in post-9/11 times of pre-
emptive warfare and the global war on terrorism, so-called failed, failing and 
weak states have increasingly come to be seen as a global security problem (if not 
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the main one) by the international community (p. 2). Although an ambiguous term, 
a weak state may be described as not “hav[ing] the capacities to penetrate society, 
regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in 
determined ways” (Migdal, 1988, p. 4). This kind of state is certainly not a new 
phenomenon. Yet, in the past, it was for various reasons simply not seen as a 
worrisome element by the dominant international powers, if otherwise not seen as 
an opportunity for expanding one's influence in the context of the Cold War.  
 
This changed with the post-Second World War de-colonisation movement and 
with the breakdown of the bipolar world order, as well as the concomitant 
exponential increase in the number of sovereign states. Yet, the mere rise in the 
number of states is obviously not a sufficient explanation for the importance of the 
current state-building debate. Robinson (2007) identifies the effects of 
globalisation as being of key significance. Globalisation, he argues, has caused a 
crisis of the state, and this has most clearly been felt in those states that already 
had little capacity to provide for security and welfare. The consequences have 
been the destabilisation and exclusion of whole societies, with all its implications, 
including food insecurity, political instability, an increase in inequality, large 
migration flows, etc. (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 175). State-building, then, is seen as a 
reaction against these challenges, as an attempt at constructing states that are “able 
to deal with globalization, namely [states] that [are] flexible and able to draw on 
social resources to cope with change” (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). In other words, the 
existence of weak states is seen as constituting a threat, in the broad meaning of 
the word, to international peace and security. Javier Solana (2004), for example, 
has suggested: “Whereas the security threats of the past century came from strong 
states, those of the 21st century come from weak and failing ones”; or as Duffield 
(2001) puts it, in relation to the emergence of so-called new, i.e. recent, 
phenomenon of intra-state war: 
  
Conventional views on the causes of the new wars usually hinge upon their arising 
from a developmental malaise of poverty, resource competition and weak or 
predatory institutions. The links between these wars and international crime and 
terrorism are also increasingly drawn. […] [I]t reflects a new security framework 
within which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous. 
(Duffield, 2001, p. 15) 
 
Chandler (2007) links the rise of the state-building discourse to what he has 
described as the ethical turn in international theorising (p. 79). With the 
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emergence of the human rights regime, the focus of international law has shifted to 
the individual. This has effectively meant that local political interests have had to 
make place for moral and ethical values, for the rights of the individual over those 
of the state. These principles are viewed as both natural and universal, leading to 
the belief that it is the duty of the world's powerful to guarantee that they are 
respected everywhere. The classical meaning of state sovereignty, being 
“supremacy at home and [the] freedom from interference in external affairs” 
(Fowler & Bunck, 1995, p. 11), is no longer valid in this context. As a 
consequence of the ascendancy of human rights as the dominant legal framework 
in international relations, sovereignty is no longer a right taken for granted. 
Rather, it is increasingly perceived as having the conditionality of good 
governance attached to it, meaning a respect for human rights and obedience to 
democratic values. This inclination towards democratic forms of governance is 
often associated with the Democratic Peace Thesis, which holds that conflicts 
between two or more democratic regimes are highly improbable (Chesterman, 
2004, p. 9).  
 
The shift in focus has led academics to believe that the content of the term 
‘sovereignty’ has changed dramatically, to a notion of asymmetrical sovereign 
equality (Hehir, 2007b, p. 187). Or as Fowler and Bunck (1995) put it, “to claim 
sovereignty is a declaration of political responsibility for governing, defending and 
promoting the welfare of a human community” (p. 13). Sovereignty has thus 
become a right granted to states that fulfil certain criteria, namely those of the 
more intellectually mature states in the system (Hehir, 2007(b), p. 188). This 
tendency is identified by Hehir and Bain as a hierarchical re-conceptualisation of 
sovereignty, meaning that some states in the international system have come to be 
seen as having achieved a higher degree of statehood than those that have not been 
able to live up to the standards of good governance and democratic legitimacy 
(Bain, 2003, p. 66). Building states, in Hehir's view, can therefore be described as 
a way of spreading the governmental system of higher states to lesser ones, 
resulting from the belief that this is the best way to prevent future conflicts (Hehir, 
2007(b), p. 188). At the same time, the objective of state-building seems to be not 
the construction of states in the classical sense, with the result being “self-
governing, independent and autonomous political subjects” (Chandler, 2006, p. 
31). Instead, the goal is the creation of political entities accountable to the 
international community, and in line with dominant economic and social policies. 
From this point of view, Chandler (2007) goes on to argue that the world is 
experiencing a new international hierarchy; states are no longer equal players, and 
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“political legitimacy, sovereign equality and the rights of non-intervention are the 
preserve of the enlightened post-modern states” (p. 81).   
 
This evolution has been particularly noticeable, for example, in the international 
debate about the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001, p. 11 e.a.), where it is 
held that governments have the responsibility to protect their citizens. If they fail 
to do so, supporters argue, the international community should hold the right to 
intervene, thus putting aside former notions of sovereign inviolability. The 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, officially legitimised by concerns about global 
security (respectively the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
harbouring of terrorist networks) as well as the promise to construct democratic 
regimes, are other clear examples of this way of reasoning. The perceived threat of 
these states has given birth to an environment in which external intervention and 
transformation of whole societies has come to be seen not only as preferable, but 
as an absolute necessity owing to the self-declared moral duty of the dominant 
powers to individuals everywhere in the world. Especially the EU and US are 
regarded (not in the least by themselves) as acting upon the promotion of 
democracy and justice, in so doing downplaying the possibility of other, more 
selfish factors playing a role as well (Chandler, 2007, p. 80).  
 
Some academics go as far as to draw comparisons between the authority exercised 
by contemporary state builders, and the usurpation of power by colonial 
administrations. Although recognizing that these are serious accusations, Wilde 
(2007) maintains that there are certain parallels to be drawn, and that it is useful to 
take up the analogy, especially in reference to issues such as the lack of 
accountability, local consent and regional ownership (p. 32). Bickerton (2005) on 
the other hand, points out that comparing state-building (and EU enlargement) to 
imperialism misinterprets the major differences in the nature of these practices, 
particularly concerning the existence of a clear underlying idea; he claims that 
both state-building and EU enlargement are in essence ad hoc processes, often 
reduced to a mere technical issue, and therefore lacking any form of vision 
whatsoever. Indeed the international community has not seldomly displayed a 
clear lack of political willingness to engage itself in long-term projects, and has 
often most of all been concerned with exit strategies and the construction of 
excuses for not having to intervene.  
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KOSOVO AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN POLICY 
 
Kosovo is certainly not the only instance of EU state-building activity in the South 
East European (SEE) region, and it is useful to examine the outcomes of similar 
EU-driven processes in order to understand and analyse the dynamics of Europe's 
activities within Kosovo. Particularly the Union's role in policy-making in post-
conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is one frequently referred to by academics 
concerned with state-building issues. It is therefore worth exploring here, before 
subsequently turning to Kosovo. Clearly, differences between BiH and Kosovo 
abound, particularly regarding the political and legal status of both entities. And 
the as yet unclear legal position of Kosovo within the international community, 
together with the apparent inability of the EU to come to a consensus regarding the 
issue, admittedly makes it very hard if not impossible to design a clear roadmap 
for the province. Yet the relevance of comparing BiH with Kosovo resides in the 
belief that significant similarities exist between the EU's administration of BiH 
and its approach towards Kosovo, the problems of which are far greater than the 
mere question of legal status. The case of BiH is particularly interesting here, 
considering that the country was widely considered a test ground for new 
approaches to international administration and novel forms of foreign assistance, 
which were then carried out elsewhere (Chandler, 2006b, p. 1). One of the main 
arguments of this section builds exactly on this idea: some of the problems the EU 
is being faced with in its attempt to move Kosovo closer to EU integration are 
inherent to the way it is carrying out the construction of state institutions in 
Kosovo, and indeed, for that matter, inherent to the way state-building is being 
conducted by other actors (UN, US, etc.) in Kosovo and elsewhere. It will be 
argued that one of the main trends visible in the practices of the EU is the 
separation of state-building from politics, which may in the long run result in the 
weakening of those institutions the international community has pledged to 
strengthen. International regulation, in the words of Champagne (2005), “can 
represent paradoxically an obstacle to the creation of a responsible state, able to 
guarantee political autonomy and communal support” (p. 7). 
 
BiH has in effect been administered by the EU since the reform of the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR) in 2002 and the subsequent transfer of more 
authority to the Directorate of European Integration (DEI), in effect establishing it 
as the most important executive body of the Bosnian government. This, together 
with the DEI's direct funding by the European Commission, has led Chandler 
(2006a) to state that Bosnia should actually be considered as the “first genuine EU 
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state where sovereignty has (…) been transferred to Brussels” (p. 44). He goes on 
to argue that the legacy of over a decade of state-building in Bosnia has created a 
complete division between power and accountability, and that, although BiH is 
formally an independent state, the country has no “independent or autonomous 
existence outside of the EU partnership” (Chandler, 2006a, p. 45). In this sense, 
the exercise of state-building in BiH has created a so-called phantom state, in 
which domestic politics are basically redundant, policy making is formed by 
external experts, and local politicians are more accountable to the international 
community than to the population they are supposed to represent. Furthermore, 
there are considerable concerns over the lack of mechanisms for overseeing the 
activities of the international administrators, especially since most of the OHR 
personnel benefits from a certain degree of immunity and can in many cases avoid 
prosecution for any missteps taken (Caplan, 2007, p. 113).  
 
Given the extent of the power exercised by the OHR and the DEI, many a 
researcher have expressed concerns over the democratic deficit institutions such as 
these seem to entail, and it inspired someone like Ignatieff to put the label Empire 
Lite on the international community's administration of BiH (Ignatieff, 2003). 
Although this may appear to be a controversial statement, the EU itself has 
recognised that its approach towards the country has been marked by significant 
shortcomings. A resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, for example, has stated that “the Assembly considers it irreconcilable 
with democratic principles that the High Representative should be able to take 
enforceable decisions without being accountable for them or obliged to justify 
their validity”, after which the Assembly called for an assessment of the 
“efficiency and rationality of the present constitutional and legal arrangements” in 
BiH (CoEPA, 2004, art. 13). Alessandro Rotta, political advisor to the SP, in a 
personal interview, also referred to this issue noting that, if the EU wants to be 
serious about assisting SEE, it will need to be serious about building local 
capacity. This is a problem, he argues, that is yet to be addressed successfully by 
the EU, especially in terms of Bosnia, where he sees an obvious contradiction 
between the Union's role as a promoter of further European integration, and its 
persistency in treating Bosnia as a protectorate incapable of effectively carrying 
out state responsibilities (Rotta, 2007). The outcome of this contradiction is hard 
to contest. The direct result of international state-building in BiH has been that 
“the powers and the authority of the state have been subsumed by external actors 
and this process has prevented any real policy-making power being devolved to 
elected bodies” (Chandler, 2006a, p. 142). From this perspective, the international 
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community can hardly be said to have successfully fulfilled its initial goal of 
reconstructing and strengthening BiH's institutions. It is feared that the EU's 
approach towards Kosovo offers little hope of being fundamentally different, and 
that the driving forces behind the state-building practices in Kosovo suffer from 
much the same illness as in the case of BiH.  
 
Firstly, as in the case of the rest of SEE, the EU's relationship with Kosovo is 
based on what is eagerly called an equal or contractual partnership, meaning that 
the involvement of the EU is subject to the consent of local politicians. This is 
reflected mainly in the Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism 
(STM) and the Stability Pact (SP), arguably two of the EU's most important state-
building and integration mechanisms, and, for Kosovo, also in the activities of the 
Union under Pillar IV of UNMIK, from which it derives its legal basis. In all of 
these initiatives, it has often been stressed that leadership over the different 
processes remains in the hands of local Kosovar politicians (see for example EC, 
2001, p. 7). Yet the alleged equal partnership the EU is flaunting has been the 
subject of much dispute. Chandler (2006a), for example, maintains that it should 
be clear that real ownership over policy-making is de facto in the hands of the 
European Commission, and that there is no such thing as real equality in this 
process, given the obvious fact that the EU possesses considerable amounts of 
leverage over Kosovo, and SEE in general (p. 104). The reason for this is the 
proverbial carrot and stick the EC is yielding, namely future accession and the 
expected progress the province should make towards this, the recognition of the 
province's independence and the threat of withdrawing financial contributions 
when policies are not in line with Europe's expectations. Given the large 
economic, political and social appeal of the EU, it is indeed not serious to claim 
that a European partnership with a region as small and economically 
underdeveloped as Kosovo can be anything close to equal. Furthermore, as 
Chesterman (2004) points out in reference to the UNMIK mission, it is simply 
misleading to claim that any sort of international administration whatsoever is “in 
any meaningful way [dependent] on local consent or ‘ownership’” (p. 152), seeing 
that the legitimisation for its existence is ultimately based on military presence.  
 
Also, in relation to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), Chandler 
(2006a) argues that the partnership between the EU and Kosovo is one between 
uneven partners, “with only one party being the judge of whether the conditions of 
the contract are met and in a position to coerce the other” (p. 106). The EU's 
deliberate focus on equity in the partnership discourse therefore masks the large 
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power disparities that are actually present, which is reflected in an ambiguous 
integration framework and much uncertainty over potential accession. In doing 
this, the EU has successfully decoupled its regulatory mechanisms over Kosovo 
from any clear promises concerning further integration. While the newborn 
country is under sizeable pressure to subordinate itself to the conditionality agreed 
upon under the STM, there is little or no pressure on the EU to live up to its own 
promises (Chandler, 2006a, p. 110). The lack of a clear timeframe for future 
accession means that the Union can delay the execution of its promises as it deems 
opportune, without according any importance to objections raised by Kosovar 
politicians. The EU seems to recognize this problem to some extent when stating 
that “the [SA] process needs to be tailored to the needs and specific conditions of 
the individual countries and (…) the proper balance needs to be struck between 
stabilisation and association” (EC, 2002, p. 8). So far though, it has failed to put 
this into practice, showing a remarkable lack of vision in its approach towards the 
region as a whole. Its strategy, as Klasnja (2007) argues, “is plagued with 
inconsistencies and half-baked measures [which] is in stark contrast with the 
pervasive expectations in both the international community and the region itself 
that the EU is the key international actor” in the region (p. 16). Sergi and Qerimi 
(2005) also make a case for a more straightforward commitment towards SEE, and 
believe that the EU should provide all states in the region with a roadmap for 
accession, and Bickerton identifies the EU's ad hoc policies, and its significant 
lack of an underlying strategy in both its enlargement and state-building activities 
as central to an understanding of the minimal progress made thus far. Europe, he 
claims, is essentially afraid of its own power (Bickerton, 2005, para, 29). 
 
The outcome of this ambiguous framework has been a decreased perception of the 
legitimacy of the EU's presence in the region. Its regulatory activities as outlined 
above under UNMIK, the STM and the SP, are increasingly being questioned in 
the face of the absence of any real commitments. “Economic and social sacrifices, 
which might make sense in the context of certainty about EU integration, have less 
appeal when it seems that policy is externally imposed with little promise of 
improvement” (Chandler, 2006a, p. 110). Legitimacy is also affected by the failure 
of the EU and UNMIK to provide a degree of social and economic security in the 
region (Welch, 2006, p. 222). Rotta for example, recognises the fact that Kosovo 
is still an economic black hole in the region, and that, in terms of economic 
development, it is certainly not on the same level as the rest of the Western 
Balkans (Rotta, 2007). This should be seen as highly problematic because, as 
pointed out in the first section of this paper, state-building is legitimated by the 
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assumption that some states, or in this case the EU, are able to export the exercise 
of good governance to those that are held to be incapable of accomplishing this 
themselves. As Zaum (2006) puts it, in the absence of democratic consent, the 
authority exercised by the different international stakeholders in Kosovo is based 
on “their expertise and their effectiveness in addressing governance problems” (p. 
468). When the policies of the international community then turn out to be mostly 
ineffective in addressing such key issues as economic reconstruction, this 
undermines both the credibility of the international administration's aims and the 
legitimacy of the power it is exercising. Many commentators go even further and 
insist that external financial support has shaped an environment of dependency 
and inefficiency. Illustrating this, Welch (2006) quotes the World Bank on its 
statement that “the influx of funds (…) has distorted domestic spending patterns, 
resulting in an actual threat to the economic stability of the province” (p. 225). 
 
Kosovo is not only dependent on the EU for financial support, it has also 
increasingly come to rely on Europe for the creation of its government policies. As 
Rotta acknowledged in our interview, the policy agenda for Kosovo is mainly set 
by the European Commission (Rotta, 2007). Here as well a key characteristic of 
the current state-building rationale can be discerned. In the discourse of state-
builders, policy-making is generally taken to be the task of specialists and foreign 
experts rather than the outcome of a political process based on popular consensus, 
thus leaving little or no room for domestic input. State-building, in this sense, is 
believed to be nothing more than a mere technical and administrative process 
(Chandler, 2006a, p. 106). The danger this entails is that externally drafted policies 
do not reflect the needs of the society they are implemented in. Indeed one of the 
major criticisms of the EU's regulatory involvement in Kosovo through the STM 
and the SP is that the policies thus promoted and imposed are more indicative of 
the concerns of the EU than anything else. This is clearly visible in the objectives 
of both the Stability Pact and the SAP, which focus mainly on stabilising the 
region through the creation of democratic processes, of multinational and 
multiethnic diversity and the return of refugees (Welch, 2006, p. 223). Although, 
of course, one could hardly claim this not to be in the interest of the majority of 
the local population, it should be noted that the stress on multiethnic diversity and 
the return of refugees reflects the priorities of the EU rather than those of the 
people of Kosovo. Chandler (2006a) aptly argues that, for example, the issue of 
multiethnic diversity is one even some of the richest EU member states are having 
problems dealing with, making it rather unfair to expect a province as poor as 
Kosovo to spend considerable amounts of its budget on achieving exactly this, 
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while the local population may indeed have totally different ideas of what its 
urgent needs are. In his words:  
 
These externally reliant policy forums have little awareness of the social 
and economic limitations to their ideal solutions and those involved in 
policy processes have little relationship to broader social concerns 
(Chandler, 2006a, p. 118).  
 
The governmental programs thus created, Rule notes, are shaped by the 
requirements and recommendations of the international donors, and therefore 
devoid of any real domestic political content (Rule, 2003, p. 152). The end result 
of all this might very well amount to the loss of not only the international 
community’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population, but even that of the local 
political elite. With the international administration holding the power to dismiss 
whoever they believe unnecessary and in effect dictating the content of the policy 
agenda, it now seems that elected officials are more accountable to the 
international community than to their own population (Hehir, 2007, p. 138).  
 
This brings us to the one of the major sources of concern in the debate about 
external intervention. The way the EU has been regulating policy-making, and 
taking on governmental tasks through UNMIK, has tended to be ignorant of all 
conventional notions of democratic authority, largely due to the fact that there are 
almost no existing mechanisms to hold either the EU or UNMIK as a whole 
accountable for its actions (Caplan, 2007, p. 115). Much as the OHR in BiH was 
criticized by the Council of Europe for not having to justify its actions, many an 
academic has put a question mark on the almost authoritarian nature of both the 
UNMIK administration and the regulatory mechanisms of the EU. It is true that in 
the case of Kosovo an ombudsperson handling complaints relating to UNMIK has 
been put into place, but this mandate is severely restricted and its findings remain 
merely advisory. Zaum (2006) quotes the ombudsperson for Kosovo as saying that 
“the people are deprived of protection of their basic rights and freedoms (…) by 
the very entity set up to guarantee them” (p. 470).  
 
The EU is arguably suffering from the same problem as UNMIK. Zaum (2006) 
describes this in the light of accountability's key importance in legitimating 
authority. The exercise of democratic power, he notes, needs to be held 
accountable for it to be justified, and the perversion of just this process is all the 
IJIS Volume 5
13
 THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO.1 (2008) 
 
 
 
more ironic given that the main objective of the EU in Kosovo, and the main 
objective of the international community in pursuing state-building in general, is 
the promotion of democratic principles (p. 469). Yet the EU has no need to 
legitimize its power over Kosovo. Precisely because it is talking up the promotion 
of local ownership and equal partnership, Europe is able to deny its power over the 
province, and indeed that over any political entity in the region that has signed the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The stress on local ownership 
puts the burden of responsibility in the hands of local politicians, who, once again, 
have little or no impact on actual policy making. In this way it is extremely easy 
for the EU to take credit for any successes, while putting the blame for the 
shortcomings of its policies on the incapability of local politicians (Chandler, 
2006a, p. 108). The Kosovar political elite, meanwhile, is not finding any 
problems pointing the finger to the international administration to justify the lack 
of progress made, thereby avoiding their own responsibility (Welch, 2006, p. 225). 
This blaming game was illustrated nicely in one of the interviews conducted for 
this research, when a former staff member of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions for 
Self-Government (PISG) indicated the poor quality of the UNMIK personnel as a 
key problem; this opinion being recorded immediately after hearing exactly the 
opposite accusation in an interview with a Brussels official (Anonymous, 2007). 
 
For many commentators, the lack of political accountability in the international 
community's presence in Kosovo is a consequence of what has been described in 
an earlier section as the ethical turn in international relations. “Political 
responsibility”, according to Cunliffe (2007), “was downplayed in the presence of 
the more pure moral responsibility of defending human rights” (p. 59). As argued 
earlier, the fulfilment of this self-proclaimed moral duty has been seen as a pure 
technical and administrative matter, and not a political one. Just as any other 
international stakeholder currently involved in state-building, the EU has 
attempted, and largely succeeded in keeping politics out of the discourse. Cunliffe 
(2007) has termed this the exercise of power without responsibility (p. 50), and his 
assertion is that this is a continuation of the politics of the '90s in the sense that it 
“aims at containing and managing symptoms rather than removing causes” 
(Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 181). It is feared that, through time, this has worked 
disruptively on domestic political processes, in the end undermining the main aims 
of the international community (Robinson, 2007, p. 10). Or to quote Chandler 
(2006a):  
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[The mechanisms of external regulation] separate the policy process 
from mechanisms of local accountability and consensus-building, which 
may result in a policy that fails to understand local problems or adjust to 
changing local circumstances (p. 112). 
 
It is interesting to analyse the status settlement debate from the perspective of 
peace without politics (Chandler, 2006b, p. 1). Up to the drafting of the Ahtisaari 
plan, the EU had not been overtly willing to make the issue of Kosovo's final 
status into one of its priorities, this of course also being complicated by heavy 
opposition from especially Russia (Klasnja, 2007, p. 23). Only most recently has it 
shown some indications of willingness to commit itself in supporting Kosovo’s 
calls for full independence, although member states have remained divided on this 
point, preventing the EU from taking a unified position. Rotta defends the EU's 
past efforts at avoiding this issue by claiming that this has been necessary in order 
to move forward with the implementation of more practical processes. The EU has 
attempted, he states, to develop parallel mechanisms, for it to progress on the 
status question and on more practical questions simultaneously (Rotta, 2007). This 
clearly reflects the general European approach as outlined above, namely the 
separation of pure technical, regulatory mechanisms from more political ones. 
Rotta (2007) himself readily admits that it is an illusion to think that politics can 
be left out of even the most practical discussions, and that the unresolved problem 
of Kosovo's final status eclipses talks about everything else. The fact that the EU 
has in the past been unwilling to acknowledge this may very well partly be 
because independence for Kosovo was simply not one of its own concerns. This 
backs up the point made earlier, that “the SAP and the SP place more faith in 
stability coming through EU conditionality than through the strengthening of 
domestic state institutions through democratic processes” (Chandler, 2006a, p. 
119), for which, debatably, in the case of Kosovo, independence is an important 
precondition. In this view, also, the more recent willingness of the EU (together 
with the US) to move forward, even without backup from the Security Council, 
can be ascribed to an increasing belief that the status quo may in the long run have 
resulted in augmented instability, not just in Kosovo, but in the region as such 
(Rehn, 2007, par. 11; Welch, 2006, p. 230). Considering that Europe's main 
objective in SEE is the prevention of exactly this, it is not altogether that 
surprising that the status settlement was eventually moved to the top of the agenda.  
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Finally it should be noted that the SP is scheduled to be replaced by a Regional 
Cooperation Council, which clearly fits in with the EU's proclaimed aim of 
increasing local and regional ownership (Rotta, 2007). Although this sounds 
promising, it remains to be seen whether or not this will actually decrease the 
dependency of Kosovo on external policy making. In the context of our above 
outlined analysis, the restructuring of the SP would actually fit in perfectly with 
the EU's tendency to deny its power over Kosovo, as it puts more responsibility in 
the hands of the region. The promotion of regional cooperation should by no 
means be interpreted as a drastic restructuring of the EU's toolbox. It is of course 
far too early to judge the successor of the Stability Pact, but Rotta (2007), at least, 
expressed some hope that with a more central role for Europe, a greater feeling of 
responsibility will also come. It should perhaps be hoped that this may then result 
in a greater feeling of what the EU can, and cannot achieve through its 
mechanisms of external regulation. 
 
As Welch (2006) puts it, “The EU needs to allow the new Kosovo, whatever its 
final status, to find its own way, make its own mistakes and grow as a society and 
political entity” (p.234). Three months after Kosovo's official declaration of 
independence, neither the UN nor the EU seem to know when they will be moving 
out of Kosovo. With the stress clearly on notions of supervised independence and 
shared sovereignty, real independence and local ownership are not likely to come 
soon for Kosovo.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has sought to analyse the EU’s policies and in Kosovo. To do this, we 
treated the EU as an actor engaged in state-building activities. It was argued that 
the underlying problems the EU are facing in its approach towards Kosovo are 
reminiscent of those it has faced in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that a number of 
these challenges are inherent to the state-building discourse of not only the EU, 
but of any other international actor in the region as well. The analysis was mainly 
conducted through the perspective of what we identified as one of the main 
characteristics of contemporary state-building practices, namely the tendency of 
the international community, and in this case specifically the EU, to leave politics 
out of the debate, and address state-building as a purely technical and 
administrative process. It was held that this resulted mainly from an increased 
importance being attached to the human rights regime, and the tendency to put 
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moral concerns above traditional political ones, the dynamics of which were 
outlined in relation to the question of sovereignty in the first part of this essay. 
 
Furthermore it was maintained that the partnership between the EU and Kosovo is 
fundamentally an unequal one, and that the EU’s attempts to stress the equality of 
its partnership, as well as its pertinent focus on local ownership, amounts to the 
denial of the power the EU is exercising over the province. In relation to 
enlargement, it was argued that this inequality of power has resulted in a 
separation of the integration agenda and the EU’s regulatory mechanisms. A clear 
roadmap for integrating the SEE region into the EU is lacking, and this has 
negatively affected the credibility of the EU in the eyes of the local population. 
Considering that the legitimacy of the EU’s activities is largely based on the 
prospect of future membership, it was argued that its authority is increasingly 
being questioned. The lack of progress made in terms of social, political and 
economic development has further shown to be undermining the legitimacy of the 
EU’s authority.  
 
Through the mechanisms of the STM and the SP, the EU was found to set the 
policy agenda of Kosovo without either substantial input from local policy makers, 
or respect for Kosovar views on their own policy priorities. In this way the agenda 
for Kosovo has come to be more indicative of the concerns of the EU, those 
mainly being for the stability of the region, than of those of Kosovo, potentially 
threatening the credibility of the domestic political process. This discrepancy is 
further aggravated by the democratic deficit of the international administration in 
Kosovo. Neither UNMIK nor the EU can in any real way be held accountable for 
the failures of their policies, and indeed the talking up of local ownership has 
created an environment in which the EU can easily downplay its power over 
Kosovo, and avoid the responsibilities that come with it.  
 
Overall, involvement in Kosovo has been marked by the EU’s lack of a clear 
vision in its state-building practices. Its approach thus far has been an ad hoc one, 
reflecting the EU’s concerns in stabilising the region rather than the needs of the 
SEE region itself. Therefore it is argued in this paper that the EU, if it wants to be 
successful in stabilising the region, and if it wants to succeed in building strong 
democratic institutions in Kosovo, will need to develop a firm and straightforward 
strategy for the region. It will have to clarify its vague promises to integrate SEE 
into the EU in order to rectify the negative results of the current ambiguity. This is 
all the more true for Kosovo considering its symbolic and political importance as a 
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test case for the EU as an international security actor. The credibility of the EU 
can only be increased if the causes of the Kosovar’s negative perception of it are 
ameliorated, and this requires visible progress in developing political, economic 
and social security. Europe, thus, has to reaffirm its commitment to the province, 
and this will involve a reassessment of its regulatory mechanisms through the 
STM and the SP. Real ownership for, and partnership with Kosovo can only come 
when the province is given the time and space to develop on its own terms, rather 
than on those of the EU. Although this essay recognises the crucial role the EU has 
to play in Kosovo, it also argues that Europe should support the domestic political 
process. This means putting politics back into the state-building and enlargement 
discourse, aiming at constructing viable political solutions rather than conflict 
management, and tackling the questions of democratic deficiency and 
accountability that are currently inherent to the processes of external regulation. 
The policy agenda for Kosovo should therefore, to a large extent, be set by 
Kosovar politicians, so as to properly support the strengthening of its 
governmental institutions and the development of real, accountable democratic 
processes. If the EU fails to do so, it might very well undermine its own efforts 
and weaken Kosovo’s institutions, potentially resulting in renewed instability. 
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